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Abstract
The set of government policies consistent with monetary competitive
equilibrium is modelled. Given assumptions conventional for the optimal
taxation literature, it is demonstrated that no loss in attainable wel-
fare results if, in response to an arbitrary monetary policy, attention
is limited to taxation and administrative policies which may be pro-
ductively efficient. Antecedent efficiency theorems are shown to be
corollaries.
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1. Introduction
Koopmans [1957] initiated the equilibrium analysis of social trade-
offs between equity and efficiency when the initial distribution of
endowments in an economy is deemed inequitable. He demonstrated the
decentralizability of any Pareto-efficient allocation as a general com-
petitive equilibrium, through the use of costlessly administrable lump-
sum taxes and transfers.
When the government does not have such potent redistributive cap-
abilities, the extent of efficiency sacrifice, for the sake of equity,
which is embodied in an optimal tax regime depends crucially upon the
nature of the governmental choice mechanism. Useful implications can
be drawn, however, from characterizations holding for every tax system
which is optimal for a government maximizing some continuous Paretian
welfare function. These are the implications derivable solely from the
presumption that no welfare loss results should an economy restrict
attention to allocations which are consumptively efficient.
Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] analyzed a government limited to the
selection of quantity taxes on individual commodities. Given a mild
aggregate demand assumption, they have shown that no sacrifice of ag-
gregate productive efficiency for the sake of equity obtains. Heller
and Shell [1974] allowed for endogenous selection of redistributive
instruments, with the resources required for administration of tax
policy dependent upon the type and complexity of tax instruments used.
2
Adding a stringent continuity assumption for administrative costs,
they also characterized productive efficiency as desirable.
-2-
The next section of this paper interprets the Diamond-Mirrlees and
Heller-Shell results by examining the types of governmental policies
which are compatible with an Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie general equilibrium
model, and the meaning of efficiency in such a model. Section J out-
lines an equilibrium model with money, transactions constraints, and a
full set of equilibrium-compatible policies: taxation, a reasonably
general formulation of monetary policy, and administrative policies.
The model is of some interest in its rather straightforward compilation
of these features.
Section 4 uses this model to demonstrate a sort of qualitative
separability of taxation and monetary policies. Specifically, no loss
in attainable welfare results if, in response to an arbitrary monetary
policy, attention is limited to taxation and administrative policies
which may be productively efficient. The general equilibrium analogues
to Diamond-Mirrlees and Heller-Shell results set out in Section 2 are
corollaries of this efficiency theorem.
2. Equilibrium Modelling of Policies
The Diamond-Mirrlees and Heller-Shell approaches to equilibrium
modelling of redistributive policy employ simplifications which omit
a fundamental complexity of general competitive equilibrium. Both
model the government as directly selecting allocations and prices for
sectors of the economy. The models are decentralized in the sense
that the government is constrained to select allocations from a "de-
centralizable" set.
The decision to use competitive equilibrium tools does impose
some limits on the types of government policies which can be analyzed.
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Presumably moral suasion is not appropriately analyzed in terms of how
equilibria are perturbed by jawboning. Nor is a model where firms are
price-taking profit or value maximizers useful to examine antitrust
policy.
What set of policies are consistent with the precepts of equili-
brium models? Basically, policies whose impact can be expressed in the
equations which define equilibrium, materials balance and decentraliza-
tion. A (possibly non-zero) vector of excess supplies which are de-
livered to government agencies can be entered into the materials balance
equation:
y - x > g (l)
where y is aggregate net productive supply, x is aggregate net consump-
tive demand, g is this vector of administrative inputs, and the inequal-
ity is not strict for any commodity which is a productive resource
(non-zero productive price)
.
The remaining equations defining an equilibrium specify that the
prices agents face support the allocations included in the materials
balance equation. Government policies can specify wedges or distor-
tions by which the price vector any agent faces differs from that faced
by the base agent (say, firm 1) . For convenience, this paper will
follow notationally the simplification of Diamond-Mirrlees, and collapse
these policies into the equation
q - p = T (2)
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where q is the price vector facing all consumers, p the productive sec-
tor prices, and t a vector of taxes (including subsidies).
An extensive set of policies can be so modelled, including agri-
cultural surplus and price support programs. If, as below, a monetary
equilibrium is being modelled, the monetary components of (1) allows
specification of currency printing and open market policies, and the
monetary components of (2) allows differential taxation of bonds.
The fundamental complexity of equilibrium theory is that any
(p,q) satisfying (2) and supporting allocations satisfying (1) is an
equilibrium for an economy where the government has selected policies
(g,x). Equilibrium is not unique, except under unusually heroic as-
sumptions, even given a specification of government policies which is
as complete as consistency allows. Government in competitive equili-
brium does not have specifiable policies powerful enough to enable the
direct selection of prices or allocations.
Recognition of this fact complicates the formulation of the pro-
ductive efficiency question. Diamond-Mirrlees and Heller-Shell char-
acterized optimal policies as exhibiting productive efficiency, in that
public sector activity is efficient when evaluated at producer prices.
This will not in general be true for any government policy package, that
prespecified policies will be efficient at every set of prices which are
equilibrium prices. The only known exception is laissez-faire policies
((g» T ) " 0) i which will not be feasible if, for example, contract en-
forcement is a costly activity.
Full equilibrium analogues to the Diamond-Mirrlees and Heller-Shell
theorems are well-defined, however, in the sense of attainable welfare,
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which is the highest level of social welfare attainable in any equilibrium
associated with a given policy package. The Diamond-Mirrlees and Heller-
Shell assumptions apply directly in full equilibrium models, and in each,
their theorem implies:
Equilibrium Productive Efficiency: Limiting attention
to policies for which there exists a productively ef-
ficient equilibrium does not reduce attainable welfare.
3. The Model Outlined
3.1. Markets and prices
The economy to be analyzed has open spot markets for j = 1,...,J
commodities in each time period t = l,....,ft. Futures markets, exten-
sively analyzed elsewhere, are eliminated here for simplicity. On all
markets, goods exchange solely for fiat money, identified as a quantity
of greenbacks, one unit of which has value p_ (to producers) or q~
(to consumers) in period t = l,....,ft.
This notational convention is maintained throughout: for t = l,...,ft,
any market statistic v is (J + 1) -dimensional, with a zero component,
v
fi
,
relating to money, v' is v absent v_ , v = (v.,.... t v_) has dimen-
sionality 8 = ft (J + 1) » and v 1 = (v.1 vA) is ftj-dimensional. Where
reference is made to an arbitrary component v , the possibility of refer-
ence to v„ is disallowed unless explicit.
All agents are presumed to know with certainty prices for all periods
at the beginning of the economy, and to show no concern for occurrences
after period ft. Uncertainty is simply beyond the scope of the present
analysis.
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Firms face producer prices p = (p, , . . . . ,Pt , P ) , and households
face consumer prices q = (q, » . . .
. ,qn) , with q = p + t, where t (x.. , t )
is the vector of quantity taxes.
Producer prices are chosen from
B
J
L
p = { P 6 r° | I p - i, t- i ,n}\ (3)
j-0 JC
and the candidate space for consumer prices is
Q = {q 6 P | q0t 6 (0,1), t
= 1, ,«}. (4)
Reference will frequently be made to prices associated with an arbi-
trary terminal horizon price for money, which is labelled u. Define
P(-) : (0,1) + o(P) 5 by
P(y) = {p 6 P | p Qfi
= u}. (5)
As p and q are identically normed, t lies in
T = {t GIR
9
| I t,. - 0, -1 < T. < 1, j - 0...J, t - 1,..,R} . (6)
Let e , (•), e TT (*) : (0,1) ->-]R be defined arbitrarily, subject to,
Li U
for all u e (0,1),
< eD (w)
< 1 - U < 1 + eL (y)
< 1. (7)
Define !(•) : (0,1) * o(T) by
T(u) = {t G T 1 eL
(u) <_ T
Qfi
< Eu (u)}. (8)
When p G P(p), choosing t G T(p) will satisfy p + t q G Q.
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Placing p in the simplex by (3) is familiar. Much less common is
the simplicial restriction of q . As modelled below, firm supply corre-
spondences are homogeneous of degree zero in p , and household demand
correspondences exhibit zero homogeneity in q . Thus, if an equilibrium
J J
existed where £ p. = 1 and £ ?1f, 3| then p and q /3 would yieldj=0 Jt j=0 Jt
the same allocations, thus still being an equilibrium and allowing
J
I t = 0. So the norm restrictions in (4) and (6) constitute a per-
j=0 Jt
missible numeraire choice.
With this numeraire convention, t may be interpreted as the
"average" excise tax level on goods in period t, and t as the com-
modity-specific deviation from this average.
3.2. Households
A superscript h represents any of the H households, which differ
substantively from usual equilibrium treatments only in the requirement
that purchases be covered by beginning-of-period money inventories, and
in the monetary tax liability at the end of the economy.
Notation:
for h = 1,...,H, j=l,...,J, t l,...,ft:
x : net purchase by household h of good j in period t.
T-T5 \-l
x. = max(0,x. ): gross purchase by h of j in t.
<jj. : endowment of h of good j at beginning of t.
c. : consumption by h of j during t.
As mentioned, zero components of (J + 1) -dimensional vectors refer
to money. Money is not consumed, so c_ is never used. ui
n
is not used,
-8-
i_
as the scalar m will represent the closing money inventory (cash on hand
after trading and compensation) for t = 0,1, 2,..., ft, and thus m. repre-
sents the initial money endowment. In this way, households are modelled
as receiving no automatic money endowment in period t = 2, 3,..., ft, but
rather as using m
,
, the previous closing inventory, to cover period t
purchases. x_ is the net amount of money received on markets in
t = l,...,ft. For notational convenience, we adopt x
fi
=
-m ., for
The following combinations are designated: x = (x» ,x. ,...,x. ),
h_,h h. M
_
, hB hB hB.
_ V h -^ _ Y hX V.X-, . . . ,X-J , X ^X_ ,X- , . . . ,Xj ) t X — 2.v.x i x — •^H1x »
h f
, h h , h' , h ? h\ h' , h h .
c
t
= Cclt,...,cJt),
c - C^ ,.,.,c
a
), a»
t
= (u
lt
,...,uj
Jt).
Finally, a representation is needed of a component vector of a con-
% x. 1 h H
sumptive sector allocation x: x, = (x. , . .
.
,x.
, . . .
,x, )
,
k = j + J(t-l) = 1 + J(t-1),2 + J(t-l),...,Jt, t = l,...,ft.
Households face four types of constraints, for h = 1,...,H,
Nonnegativity
:
x + w _> c S c
, (9)
where C C IR, is the feasible consumption set. This is a standard con-
straint: nonnegative, physically consumable consumption out of stocks.
Fidelity: q x£ <_ 0. (10)
This is merely a definition of x„ , satisfied whenever the value of goods
received does not exceed the value of cash dispersed.
Solvency: <_ m <_ m + x . (11)
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A household raising or lowering its money holdings as purchases and sales
are (potentially) dissynchronized is constrained to be solvent, that is,
to maintain at all times a nonnegative money inventory.
mQ >_ is perhaps the closest analogue in this model to a budget
constraint. The right-hand inequality is merely an accounting balance:
closing inventory cannot exceed opening inventory plus net receipts.
Liquidity: qtxt - ° ^12 ^
This constraint codifies the timing convention chosen as perhaps the
simplest modelling of a critical role for money in economizing on trans-
actions. During each period, purchases must be covered with cash before
compensation for sales during the period is realized. Thus period t pur-
u
chases are limited in value by (12) to the value of m . , the previous
period's closing money inventory. Period t sales will raise m and cover
purchases in t + 1.
Denote the household's feasible or budget correspondence X (•)
:
a
Q + oOR ), defined by
X^q) = {xh eiR9 | xh satisfies (9)-(12)}. (13)
Household behavior is then specified by
max U (c ) subject to x 6 X (q) , m_ <_ m
fl
. (14)
The convention specified by the final inequality in (14) is separated
from the constraints of (13) to draw attention to the treatment of ter-
minal money stock. In positing a terminal horizon of the economy known
with certainty from the beginning by all agents, an anomaly not character-
istic of real-world economies is introduced. As money is inherently
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valueless upon termination of the economy, all agents will attempt to rid
themselves of it for the sake of greater last-minute consumption, making
a positive price of money impossible in period ft. But if valueless then,
money must also have a zero price in ft - 1, and by induction, in all
periods.
Following Heller [1974] and Okuno [1976] in adopting a suggestion
of Lerner [1947], an artificial contrivance is used to respond to this
artificially created anomaly. The government is presumed to collect in
cash a tax liability from each household, upon the close of period ft
trading, in nominal amount equal to the initial cash endowment of the
household, ny.. Contrained by (14) to have at least this much money on
hand, the household is willing to supply commodities for money in the
final period. The possibility of a positive terminal money price being
substainable is ensured.
The (net) demand correspondence x (•) : Q * o(jR ) is defined by:
x
h
(q) = {xh € Xh (q) | x
h is a solution to (14)}. (15)
Maintained assumptions, for h = 1,...,H:
h.l. C is closed, convex, bounded below, and contains u in its
interior, for t = l,...,ft, m
n
> 0.
Clearly intX (q) ^ by these assumptions, which then have the
familiar purpose of ensuring that X (•) is continuous, compact- and
convex-valued on Q (Heller [1974], Lemma 2, p. 101). m > guarantees
the possibility of nonautarkic behavior, allowing some credulity for the
presumed inefficiency of barter transactions.
-11-
1_
h.2. u (•) is a continuous, nondecreasing, real-valued function which
exhibits convex epigraphs and local nonsatiation.
Presumably familiar, this guarantees that x (•) is upper hemi-
continuous (uhc) and compact- and convex-valued on Q (Berge [1963],
p. 116).
k. 3. (Diamond-Mirrlees) For all x e x(q) for any q e Q, either
(1) x. < for some k e {1,2, . .. ,Jfi}, or
(2) x, > for some k e (1,2, .. ., Jfl} for which q > 0,
k = j + J(t-l). 9
3.3. Firms
Extensive exploration of firm behavior is well outside the focus of
this study. Consequently, modelling of firms has been simplified as much
as possible, even at the expense of treatment asymmetric with household
modelling.
Any of the F firms is represented by superscript f. Net supply by
firm f of good j in period t is y. , f = 1,...,F, j = 1,...,J, t l,...,ft.
yn designates net units of money dispersed on markets in t = !,...,&.
Thus, for t = l,...,ft, if pQ
> 0,
yot -
~pt y t' /p0f (16)
f £' f f
By rearrangement, p
fc
yt
= 0. As before, y
fc
= (ylt ,...,yJt )
,
f , £ f' f t f f\ p f «v _ fyt
= (y
ot' y t )j y
= Wi*"**^* y = Z fy » y = xfy •
f
«
A production plan y may be interpreted as the production of out-
f
'
f
'
puts max (0, y ) from inputs max (0, -y ) . The set of feasible produc-
tion plans is Y C]R
.
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Futures markets have been excluded as cuaberscne, and analysis of
their import can be found elsewhere. Production is modelled as intra-
period with possibilities unchanged over the course of the economy.
Firm behavior, presumed to be price-taking profit maximization,
can thus be described intraperiodically, as the distinction between
f i
nominal profits in t (.pi yr ) and the discounted value of profits in
t (-y
n
) has no behavioral significance. '
f 6
The (net) supply correspondence y (•) : P -*• o(B. ), f = 1,...,F, is
defined by:
y
f
(?) = {y
f 6 1R9 | y*' 6 Y*
, PVft
'
> p' J» for all j • € Yf ,
P tyJ
= 0, pQt
= implies
| y^ | <ky> t = 1 Q}, (17)
where k is an arbitrary, large bound.
Assumptions for firms:
£.1. For all f = 1,...,F : Y is a closed, convex cone containing
Convexity is a standard assumption, and Cass [3] and McKenzie [17]
establish the use of a fictitious factor of production to represent
decreasing returns production, with profits distribution to share-
12holders, as choice over a cone technology.
*.2. Production is irreversible.
For this modelling of firm behavior, y (•) is uhc on P (Earstad
[1977], Lemma 2.1).
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3.4. Governmental activity
The government selects a vector of quantity taxes x £ T, and a
vector g of inputs to administration, constrained by
(g.x) 6 G C {(g,t) 6 829 |t6I, g;>0, | g0t | < kg , t = l,... ffl}. (18)
where G is the administrative feasibility set, and k is some arbitrary,
©
large bound.
g
It is useful to define the feasible correspondence G(*) : T •* oOR ),
by G(t) = {g€ R6 | (g, T ) e G}. (19)
The following assumption is maintained:
g.l. G is closed and exhibits limited free disposal
((g,x) e G and g' >_ g* imply (g,x) € G) . G(x) * for all x 6 T.
This ensures the feasibility of an active commodity policy which could
purchase more than the minimal requirement of any administrative input.
Additionally, the assumption opens a full role for monetary policy, as
only physical commodities are required for administration—any inflow
or outflow of money is administratively feasible. So the stream
(gni ,gn„,...,gn ) will represent the governmentally selected monetary
policy, the net inflows of money to the treasury.
3.2. (Heller-Shell) G( # ) is a continuous correspondence on T.
3.5. Equilibrium for given policies
•\* 'v 48
For ease of notation, let a = (x, y, p, q) £ R , and
A = [x(Q) x y(P) x P x Q] C fc
46
.
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For given (g,T) G G, an equilibrium is a vector a e A satisfying
q - P = t (20)
x - y + g < 0, p(x - y + g) =0, (21)
x
h e xh (q) for all h = 1.....H, (22)
and y
f 6 y
f
(p) for all f = 1,...,F.
13
(23)
Monetary equilibrium models generally are ensured of the existence
of equilibrium, as setting all spot market money prices at zero leaves
autarky the only possibility for firms and households. Such a position,
however, constitutes excessive reliance on the assumption that barter
transactions are unused since less efficient than monetary transactions.
This assumption is quite tenable when money has a positive price, but
barter transactions, not necessarily in balancing amounts, would un-
doubtedly be desired in the event of monetary collapse.
Autarky has also been ignored in the mechanisms used to model ad-
ministrative costs, which are deemed to arise from the need to monitor
economic activity. This is in the spirit of the endogenous policy ap-
proach of Heller and Shell [1974], for upon finding desired redistribu-
tion impossible or prohibitively costly in a barter economy, a government
could be predicted to encourage and support the development and mainten-
ance of monetary modes of exchange.
For these reasons, equilibrium has been defined so as to include
the requirement (q £ Q) that monetary methods of exchange are being used
by consumers. The possibility that P~ = in equilibrium is included
-15-
only due to the simplified representation of firm behavior which has
made this variable insignificant, as a component of a.
The (possibly empty) equilibrium correspondence E(») : G * o(A)
is defined by:
E(g,x) = {a e A | a satisfies (20)-(23)} (24)
Let D = {(g,i) £ G | E(g,t) ± 0}. (25)
D is the domain for policy selection in an equilibrium model of
endogenous policy theory.
It would be convenient to have a guarantee that D is nonempty. Only
minor adaptations are needed to apply the equilibrium theorem of Heller
[1974] to show that an equilibrium exists for (g,x) = (0,0). However,
the administrative feasibility set may not include the zero vector.
Mantel [1975], in a barter model, demonstrates the existence of
equilibrium for any tax package satisfying a complex nonexcessive sub-
sidies assumption. He does not show that the set of taxes meeting this
restriction is nonempty. As nonexcessive subsidies roughly requires
that the government satisfy its budget constraint at any price vector
(not just at equilibrium prices) , I have not succeeded in constructing
an argument that any nontrivial (g,x) meets this condition. The non-
emptiness of D remains a technical difficulty.
3.6. The equilibrium-policy set
It is convenient to designate z = (a, g, t) = (x, y, p, q, g, x),
and to define the graph of the correspondence E(«) as the equilibrium-
policy set:
-16-
Z = {z e a x D
J
a£ E(g,x)}. (26)
Let the correspondence Z( # ) : (0,1) o(Z) be defined by:
Z(u) = {z e z
J
x 6 10,), p Qfi
=
„}. (27)
Then Z is bounded, and Z(y) is compact for y € (0,1) (Harstad [1977],
14
Lemmata 2.2, 2.3, Theorem 2.4).
3.7. Optimal policies
Let DC') : (0,1) » o(D) be defined by
DGO = C(g,T) 6 D | t € T(y)}. (28)
The relationships among terminal price levels, policy packages, and
attainable consumption sector allocations are represented by
e(») : (0,1) x D + o[x(Q)], defined by
e(u,g,x) =
{x|(x,y,p,q) 6 E(g,x), for some q,y,p S P(u)}, t £ T(u)
(29)
0, otherwise.
H8
Let the welfare index w(») : JR. * IR be a continuous function of alloca-
tions, and Paretian in the sense that it is derivable from a welfare
function which is an increasing function of utility levels. Designate
the attainable welfare function, W(») : (0,1) x D -+TR, defined by
r [max w(x) subject to x G e(y,g,x)], (g,x) e D(y)
W(y,g,x) = < (30)
0, otherwise.
-17-
Existence of this maximum is guaranteed by compactness of Z(y).
Theorem 1. For any y £ (0,1), attainable welfare W(y,«) achieves
a maximum on D(y).
Proof: Pick arbitrary y e (0,1). Define b(«) : Z(y) * JR by b(z) = w(x)
.
As Z(y) is compact, and b(») is continuous by construction, there exists
z* £ Z(y) satisfying b(z*) >_ b(z) for all z e Z(y). By construction,
W(y,g*,T*) >_W(y,g,x) for all (g,t) € D(y).
The existence of optimal policies in the face of price indeterminacy
cannot be guaranteed.
4. Productive Efficiency
For convenience, represent g as (g ,g'). where gQ
= (gQ1 , . . . ,gQJp ,
g* - (4»....gy. and define r(-) : (0,1) * o(IRfi ) by
r(l») = {gQ
e a | (g ,g',T) 6 D(y) for some g' > 0, t e T(y)} (31)
where D(y) is D(y) adjusted for component reordering. Let
T = {gQ
e R"
| gQ
€ r(y) for some y € (0,1)}. (32)
Define D°(«) : (0,1) x T * o(D) by
{(g,x) e D(y)
| gQ
= y}, Y e r(y)
D°(y,Y) = <j (33)
L
..
otherwise,
and Z°(«) : (0,1) x T * o(Z) by
-18-
r (z e z | (g,T) e D°(y,Y)}, Y § rCy)
Z°Cu,Y) = < (34)
*- 0, otherwise.
D (y,y) is the set of policies which are decentralizable given an
arbitrary resolution of price indeterminacy and an arbitrary choice of
monetary policy. Next, the set of consumer allocations attainable given
'Vi
these restrictions must be specified. Let e (•) : (0,1) x T + o[x(Q)]
be defined by
|" {x S x(Q) | x e e(u,g,x) for some (g,x) G D (u,y)}, y e r(u)
e°(p,Y) = i (35)
L 0, otherwise.
Efficiency will be evaluated in terms of whether aggregate produc-
tion net of administrative inputs is on the boundary of the net possi-
bilities set. Designating Y = £.p(Y x .... x Y ) CJt and defining
G'C) : T + oCR^") by
G'(t) = {g f CR™ | ( g() ,g') e g(t) for some gQ en"}, (36)
represent the net possibilities correspondence as N(«) : T + oCR ),
defined by
N(t) = {n« StrJ" | n » £ [Y - G'(t)]}. (37)
The two critical sets for efficiency analysis can now be defined.
Let Z
1
(«) : (0,1) x r * o(Z) be defined by
-19-
{z G Z°(u,y)
I
w(x) > w(x) for all x G e°(y,Y)}, Y 6 Uy)
Z^y.Y) = > (38)
L 0, otherwise,
and Z2 («) : (0,1) x T -»- o(Z) by
r {z G Z°(y,Y) | y' - g' « n' € bdy N(t)}, y G r(y)
Z
2
(y,Y) =
I
(39)
0, otherwise.
Given y,Y> Z (u,y) is the set of equilibrium-policy relations for which
2
the maximum level of attainable welfare is reached, and Z (p,y) is the
productively efficient subset of Z.
1 2
Theorem 2. Given any y G (0,1), any y e T(y), Z (y,Y) n Z (y,Y) f 0.
That is, for arbitrary monetary policy, optimal tax and administrative
policy responses are productively efficient.
The proof of the theorem, which is presented in section 5, handles
several complications which do not arise in the Diamond-Mirrlees model,
but essentially the same logic is used. Diamond-Mirrlees presume an in-
efficient optimum. Given their demand assumption, there exists a Pareto-
improving price change. If the presumed optimal allocation is interior
to the aggregate net production possibilities set, there exists a nearby
feasible allocation supported by the Pareto-superior price vector. This
contradicts the original presumption. Notice that their argument held
net tax receipts constant at zero while showing feasibility of a dominat-
ing allocation. In this model, zero monetary inflows have no special role,
-20-
so the Diamond-Mirrlees argument can be replicated holding monetary in-
flows at an arbitrary level.
5. Proof of Theorem 2
1 2
1) Suppose the contrary: Z (u,y) n Z (y,y) = 0. For any
z* € Z (u,y), n* 6 int N(t*).
2) By /x.3., there exists q G 3R , q ^ 0, so that q = (q* + Aq) 6 Q
is Pareto-superior to q* for any A G (0,1],
•v 'v % . 17
For arbitrary e.. > 0, suppose x(q) O n (x*) = for every A e (0,1].
e
l
,
Oj
As Z (h,y) is compact by construction (Karstad [1977], Thro. 2.4),andx(*) is uhc
on Q, there exists z** £ Z (y,y) such that either:
2
a) z** e Z (u,y)> as desired, or
b) there exists q
-
,
Pareto-superior to q** and arbitrarily
close, so that x(§) n n (x**) ± for any e 1 > 0.£
1
3) Assume, then, without loss of generality that for any
A
(e-, £„) >> 0, there exists (x,§) satisfying:
A
a) q £ Q is Pareto-superior to q*,
A
b) q e n (q*), and
G
2
'
„
c) x e x(q), x e n (x*).
e
l
4) As n*' S int N(t*) and G'(») is continuous on T by Q.2.,
A A A A
n** S N(t) for any x 6 w. (x*). This in turn implies n' e N(t) for
£
3
any n' £ it (n*'), and e„ > 0, any e, > for suitably small (e^e,^.).
4 A
5) Therefore, there exists (g,y) satisfying:AAA
a) y* - g« = n«,
A A
b) g£ G(t), as G(») is continuous,
A
c) gQ
= Y, by (18), and
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A
d) y e yCp) for some p £ n (p*) , for any e s > 0, for£
5
3
suitably small (£.,£„,£,).
A A AAA
6) As q S n (q*) and p e n (p*) , (q - p) = t S n (t*) for
£
2
e
5
£
3
any e„ > for suitably small (e„,e»).
A
7) If for any component jt, x* < n* , then p* = 0, and p could
A A
have been chosen above with p. = 0, while satisfying p G n (p*)
,
J e5
n' £ n (n*)
,
guaranteeing x.^ < n. -
e
4 Jt
- jt
8) For any component jt with x* = n* , x. S fl(n* ) . Thus,
A AAA
for suitably small (e
1
e,) , z can be chosen to guarantee a G ECg»T)
As q was chosen Pareto-superior to q*, w(x) > w(x) , contradicting
supposition that z* S z (y,y)^
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Footnotes
1. Assumption k.3. below, used to guarantee the existence of Pareto-
improving price changes.
2. Assumption Q.2. below, used to guarantee that small changes in tax
rates can be feasibly administered given small changes in adminis-
trative resources. Heller-Shell present a realistic example of an
administrative technology which does not satisfy this assumption.
3. Diamond-Mirrlees model the government as selecting consumer prices
and firm allocations, subject to being on the boundary of the
private sector possibilities set. Heller-Shell have the govern-
ment choosing firm and household allocations, subject to the
existence of a vector of buying and selling prices, each for pro-
ducers and consumers, which supports the allocations, given house-
hold-specific lump-sum taxes and transfers, and firm-specific
profits taxes and license fees.
4. TR is the 9-dimensional real space. Throughout, E. = {v 6E | v >_ 0},
6 8
JR, , = int JR . Vector inequalities: v > implies v. > 0, all j in-
"" + — j — -
eluding 0; v > implies v >_ ^ v; v >> implies v. > all j
including . J
5. o(S) is read "the set of subsets of S" and is the power set for S.
A mapping <j>: S -*• S is point-valued,
<f>
: S * o(S) is set-valued.
6. An obvious generalization, avoided for simplicity, is to require
nonnegative money holdings in a model with bond markets. If the
sale of bonds includes the incurrence of transactions costs,
possibly through a timing mechanism similar to (12) (some feature
is needed to make bonds and money distinct assets in equilibrium),
earlier drafts and various futures markets literatures convince
me that the qualitative results below are maintained.
7. More complicated modellings of transactions costs may well leave
households with nonconvex budget sets, which would create substan-
tial mathematical difficulties best avoided here. If impact of
transactions costs is restricted to maintain convexity, and money
still plays a critical role, the structure of household behavior
should be qualitatively unaltered, and the analysis to follow
should apply.
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8. ul 6 int Ch implies uP » 0. Heller [1974], p. 103: "This is a
familiar if absurd assumption. I believe it can be replaced in the
usual manner at the usual cost of a substantial increase in the
complexity of the proofs." Heller does not vary underlying para-
meters and examine the resultant variation in equilibria. I cannot
be certain the assumption is not crucial here. Weymark [1978],
p. 4: "In the context of the optimal taxation literature, where
no lump-sum taxation is possible, this is a highly restrictive
assumption." On the one hand, with administrative costs incumbent
upon all tax instruments, lump-sum taxation no longer enjoys such
a unique position. On the other hand, (12) is more readily de-
fended when time periods are interpreted as short, making u> >> 0,
all t, even less tenable.
9. This assumes the existence of either a common demand or a common
supply good. Weymark [1978] shows in essence that this can be
weakened to being able to find a basis for the commodity space
such that some composite good is in common demand or common
supply. No primitive assumptions (that is, no assumptions about
individual characteristics of agents, rather than combined char-
acteristics of sets of agents) suffice to guarantee the existence
of common demand or supply goods.
10. Note that if pn = 1 for any t e {l,...,fi}, any feasible y is
profit-maximal, and yn =0. If p» = 0, any t, nominal profit
maximization is well-defined, and the supply correspondence defined
in (17) includes any y which is optimal in other periods, and for
f
which y maximizes nominal profits (that is, it includes all
c
fbounded values of y_ ) •
11. Readers may be interested in whether the analysis to follow extends
to a model where firms are treated symmetrically to households, and
must pay cash for period t purchases before receiving payment for
period t sales. First, the model would have to allow for firms
having initial endowments of cash, and a terminal tax would be re-
quired to provide an incentive for firms to supply goods for money
in period ft. Second, in such a model, the distinction between
nominal and discounted profits would be critical. Without addi-
tional features, the objective of price-taking firms would be un-
clear. If a full set of future markets were added, and provision
was made for an equilibrium distinction between bonds and money
as assets, and money still economized on transactions, firms would
maximize the first-period discounted value of profits streams.
Analysis virtually identical to that presented below could be
applied by similar argument to such a model, with the candidate
set for producer prices restricted to Q. A significantly dis-
similar argument would be required at one step, noted in footnote
14, below.
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12. Household behavior has been modelled consistent with the possibility
of a commodity in which utility is degenerate. The strict positivity
of endowments, discussed in footnote 8, implies that each household
holds a positive ownership share of each firm. R. ={v e JR | v < 0}.
13. A direct implication of the equilibrium conditions is the exact
balance of the government budget at the level of the selected mone-
tary policy in each period where p
fi
> (if p- = 0, y_ is in-
determinate—footnote 10) . From (21)
,
sot " *ot -
x
0t
= qt
x
[ ' qot - ptyt ' Pot
, <;*- Tt*'t * ,jg - y')
—-
—
+
, so
T
0t P0t
q 'x 1 t'x 1 p 'g'Vt
,
t t "t5t
8ot
=
T
0t
+
^t ^t
*
The last line states that the net inflow of money to the government
in period t equals the net receipts from the average tax rate plus
the net receipts from the commodity-specific deviations from this
average rate (either of these two terms may be negative) minus the
money spent to purchase administrative inputs.
14. Lemma 2.2: Z is bounded. Lemma 2.3: Given any y G (0,1), any
sequence {q } -» q with q G Q for all n, and q G [P(y)/Q]; for
any {x } with x 6 x (q ) , {x } is unbounded, for any
h = 1,...,H. Theorem 2.4: For any u G (0,1), Z(y) is compact.
To extend the present analysis to the model discussed in
footnote 11, a lemma similar to Lemma 2.3 would be required, show-
ing that firm supplies explode when {p } -*• p with p € Q for all
n, p° 6 [P(u)/Q].
15. Harstad [1977] presents an example. It assumes a convergent se-
quence of policies increasing in attainable welfare. The asso-
ciated welfare-attaining sequence of allocations converges to an
allocation which is not feasible, because the corresponding se-
quence of equilibrium prices converges to monetary collapse.
16. Resolving price level indeterminacy does not directly enter the
efficiency argument, but is needed to ensure the existence of an
optimum, that is, to ensure Z (y,y) f4 0.
A A
17. n (v) = {v G s|
|
|v-v| | < e} for any v G s.
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